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by ROBERT B. MCKENNA & RONALD L. SLYTER*
In a previous issue of COMM/ENT, the authors participated
in a Symposium on the AT&T divestiture, arguing that the
line-of-business restrictions imposed on the Bell Operating
Companies (BOCs) pursuant to the divestiture consent decree'
were unnecessary, anticompetitive and predicated upon as-
sumptions which were fundamentally false and inherently con-
tradictory.2 Two other articles on the divestiture decree also
appeared in the Symposium issue, one by John R. Worthington,
Senior Vice President and General Counsel for MCI Communi-
cations Corporation,3 and one by James P. Denvir, a chief Jus-
tice Department architect of the decree.4 In this brief
rejoinder, the authors would like to accept COMM/ENT's invi-
tation to highlight several key developments since the last arti-
cle and to discuss several aspects of the Worthington article
which we feel merit special attention.
*Editor's Note:
The following three articles respond to articles by the same authors appearing in
Volume 9:1 of COMM/ENT.
1. The AT&T divestiture was implemented pursuant to a consent decree ap-
proved and modified by the Court in United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F.
Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983) [hereinafter AT&T ]. The term "MFJ" or "Modification of Final Judgment"
refers to the divestiture decree itself which is appended to the AT&T decision at 552 F.
Supp. 226. We utilize the terms "BOC" (Bell Operating Company) or "RBOC" (Re-
gional Bell Operating Company) to refer to the divested Bell Operating Companies.
The line-of-business restrictions prevent a BOC from providing "interexchange" or
"information" services, from manufacturing equipment, or from engaging in practi-
cally any other business except the provision of exchange services. McKenna &
Slyter, The Modimfation of Final Judgment An Exercise in Judicial Overkill, 9
Comm/ENT L.J. 9 (1986).
2. Id. at 11-13.
3. Worthington,The Case for Continued Judicial En'forcement of the AT&T De-
cree, 9 COMM/ENT L.J. 75 (1986).
4. Denvir, The Dole BilL Freeing the Telephone Company Seven?, 9 COMM/ENT
LJ. 113 (1986).
COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 9:565
I
Subsequent Developments - The First Triennial
Report of the Department of Justice
In defending the Modification of Final Judgment's (MFJ)
line-of-business restrictions during the 1982 proceeding antece-
dent to entry of the MFJ against charges that they were unnec-
essary and anticompetitive, the Department of Justice (DOJ or
Department) committed to the court that it would review the
continuing necessity for retaining the restrictions (or any one
of them) every three years after divestiture.5 On February 2,
1987, the Department submitted its first triennial report.' The
DOJ Report was based significantly on a factual report pre-
pared by Dr. Peter Huber and submitted to the Court with the
Department's filing.7 Based upon a detailed assessment of the
state of competition in local exchange telecommunications
markets, the DOJ Report tentatively concluded:'
1. That the MFJ prohibition against BOC manufacturing
and marketing of telecommunications equipment be elimi-
nated entirely;9
2. That the MFJ prohibition against BOC provision of in-
formation services be eliminated entirely;10
3. That the prohibition against. BOC entry into businesses
5. Response of the United States to Public Comments on Proposed Modification
of Final Judgment, United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., (AT&T), 552 F. Supp.
131 (D.D.C. 1982) (No. 82-0192) 47 Fed. Reg. 23,320, 23,337 (1982).
6. Report and Recommendations of the United States Concerning the Line of
Business Restrictions Imposed on the Bell Operating Companies by the Modification
of Final Judgment (filed Feb. 2,1987), United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civil Action
No. 82-0192 (D.D.C.) [hereinafter DOJ Report].
7. P. HUBER, THE GEODESIC NErwoRK: 1987 REPORT ON COMPETITION IN THE
TELEPHONE INDUSTRY [hereinafter HUBER REPORT].
8. The recommendations are tentative insofar as the Department advised the
court that it reserved the right to modify its recommendations after reviewing the
public comments on the Report. DOJ Report, supra note 6, at 8.
9. Id. at 155. The DOJ Report found that the "dispersal of equipment consump-
tion and the steady consolidation of equipment production," coupled with the fact that
the seven RBOCs are now independent purchasers, had dramatically altered the
equipment markets since the pre-divestiture era. Id. at 161 (quoting HUBER REPORT,
supra note 7, at 1.10). Regulatory rules regarding interconnection, id. at 164, and cost
allocation, id. at 165, prevent anticompetitive conduct, and the cost of continuing the
manufacturing restriction outweighs whatever benefits motivated their original impo-
sition, id. at 165.
10. Id. at 104. The DOJ Report found that the information services prohibition
was particularly costly to consumers, id. at 104, that powerful existing information
service providers are not nearly as vulnerable to exchange carrier manipulation as
was assumed in 1982, id. at 112, 126-33, and that the Federal Communications Corn-
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otherthan exchange telecommunications and exchange and in-
formation access be eliminated entirely;"
4. That the MFJ prohibition against BOC provision of "in-
terexchange services" outside of areas where BOCs provide ex-
change service as a "legally protected local monopoly" be
removed;1
2
5. That the MFJ prohibition against BOC provision of in-
terexchange cellular radio and other specialized services be
eliminated;' 3 and
6. That the MFJ prohibition against BOC provision of all
interexchange services within an area where a BOC provides
exchange service be removed when existing barriers to entry
and resale within that local exchange area are removed.
14
In short, the Department's preliminary recommendations to
the Court are that practically all of the MFJ's line-of-business
restrictions be removed entirely. The other key MFJ injunc-
tive provision, the requirement that BOCs grant "equal ex-
change access" to all interexchange carriers and to all in-
formation service providers, 3 would remain intact under the
Department's proposal.
These recommendations have struck some observers as dra-
mission (Commission or FCC) is capable of preventing competitive abuses through
regulation, id. at 104, 137-38.
11. Id. at 206-09.
12. Id. at 59. The Department recognized the overall success of the MFJ's "equal
exchange access" program in promoting competition (although AT&T remains the
dominant interexchange provider), id. at 65-66. This fact, that is, the existence of
seven independent RBOCs, id. at 73-84, and other competitive and regulatory factors,
id. at 74-77, 90, have reduced the BOCs' ability to impede competition in the inter-
exchange market, especially in areas where they do not provide exchange services, id.
at 71-77.
When the Department actually filed its motion for removal of the restrictions im-
posed on the BOCs by Section II(D) of the MFJ on April 27, 1987, while continuing to
recommend rescission of those restrictions, it modified the interexchange recommen-
dation. The Department moved that the interexchange prohibition should be lifted
on a LATA by LATA basis via the Section VIII(c) waiver process. For a discussion of
the Section VIII(c) waiver process, see McKenna & Slyter, supra note 1, at 24-25, 59-
60.
13. Id. at 59.
14. Id. at 59-60. The Department's theory is that absence of entry barriers and
resale restrictions will eliminate the "bottleneck" character of the local exchange.
While the Department's analysis is clearly correct, it remains a bit extreme. As noted
in our previous article, standard "bottleneck" or essential facilities law requires rea-
sonable access; it does not require (or even suggest) that the owner of an essential
facility should be excluded from other related markets. McKenna & Slyter, supra,
note 1, at 53-54.
15. Id. at 68-70. See id. at 14-15 for a discussion of exchange and interexchange
services, and at 46-49 for an examination of the "equal access" injunction.
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matic,'16 prompting some to contend that the Department has in
essence abandoned its duty to enforce the antitrust laws.17
AT&T itself has proclaimed a proprietary interest in retaining
the interexchange and manufacturing prohibitions, essentially
contending that they cannot be removed over its objection as a
party to the MFJ.'8 In point of fact, the Department's recom-
mendations simply reflect a proper view of the realities of tele-
communications competition and the competence of regulators
to fulfill their statutory mandates.
The Department's Report reached two fundamental conclu-
sions: first, that technological developments are rapidly dis-
persing electronic network intelligence"9 in a manner which is
eroding the bottleneck power the BOCs have because of their
control of local exchange networks;2° and second, that the wel-
fare-enhancing role of regulation in the evolving telecommuni-
cations network is not performed (or served) by entry
prohibitions, but rather by promotion of entry at all levels, en-
suring the widespread availability of interconnection to essen-
tial facilities.2' In the context of today's telecommunications
marketplace, both of these conclusions appear to be un-
assailable.
Key to the Huber Report's analysis (and fundamental to the
DOJ's recommendations) is the observation that technological
and cost considerations are driving network intelligence to the
perimeter of the network. In the traditional telephone net-
work, switching intelligence has been centrally located result-
16. See generally MCI's Response to Recommendations Concerning the Line-of-
Business Restrictions and Related Procedures (filed Mar. 13, 1987), United States v.
Western Elec. Co., Civil Action No. 82-0192 (D.D.C.) [hereinafter MCI Response];
North American Telecommunications Ass'n Comments on the Department of Jus-
tice's Recommendations (filed Mar. 13, 1987), United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civil
Action No. 82-0192 (D.D.C.) [hereinafter NATA Comments]; Comments of the Ameri-
can Newspaper Publishers Ass'n (filed Mar. 13, 1987), United States v. Western Elec.
Co., Civil Action No. 82-0192 (D.D.C.).
17. See AT&T's Comments on the Report and Recommendations of the United
States at 9-19 (filed Mar. 13, 1987), United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civil Action No.
82-0192 (D.D.C.) [hereinafter AT&T Comments]; NATA Comments, supra note 16, at
1-4.
18. AT&T Comments, supra note 17, at 7.
19. Electronic network intelligence refers to the processing power which enables
a network to function. At its most basic level network intelligence is manifested in
the switching of calls.
20. DOJ Report, supra note 6, at 40-41 (citing HUBER REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.3-
1.6).
21. Id. at 43 (citing HUBER REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.31-1.33, 2.23-2.26).
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ing in a "hierarchical" network structure, characterized by
Huber as a "pyramidal network."22 As switching costs have de-
clined, network functions have become more and more dis-
persed - primarily (at least today) onto customer premises
themselves. Huber refers to this much more diffuse network
structure as a "geodesic network," wherein "nodes (switches or
computers) are connected along a 'geodesic'- a path of mini-
mum length.
2 3
Huber observes that this technological trend has resulted in a
number of changes in telecommunications patterns. The most
obvious has been the proliferation of network-type switching
equipment and its movement to the customer's premises. 4
With major customers controlling their own switching, inter-
exchange carriers can modify their own interexchange network
switches and permit direct connection to a customer's premises
switch (avoiding use of the exchange network switch alto-
gether).2 Numerous electronic functions, once thought to be
inherent solely in the massive network switches residing in ex-
change carrier central offices, can now be provided outside the
traditional network as well: "the most powerful force at work
here is... technology, which is impelling an irreversible disper-
sion of network intelligence. "26 Huber summed up these devel-
opments as follows:
And the sum total of these changes can only be characterized
as a revolution. The old network had a simple Euclidean struc-
ture, with an inside and an outside, and clear divisions between
them. The new network is described by the mathematics of
fractals, with nodes leading into lines, which lead into more
nodes, the pattern replicating itself indefinitely down to the
smallest scales. The old network made each link in the edifice
utterly dependent for support on one link above and one be-
low. Today's smart switches and terminals can hand off and
receive traffic and information from all sides. The old pyra-
mid, with all its mass in the center, is being transformed into a
geodesic dome, with a profusion of nodes and links unknown in
the older architecture, connected around the outside. AT&T
undoubtedly recognized this clearly when it agreed to surren-
der the heart of its old network for permission to participate
22. HUBER REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.2.
23. Id. at 1.3 (footnote omitted).
24. Id. at 1.3-1.4.
25. Id. at 1.4-1.5.
26. Id. at 1.31.
1987]
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fully in building the new one.27
Huber further notes that "notwithstanding divestiture, the
geodesic network will end up managed by a small number of
giant, vertically integrated firms, AT&T among them.""8 The
surviving communications providers of the future will be "ver-
tically integrated provider[s] of end-to-end connections, among
humans and machines, operating transparently in voice, video,
and data formats, and reaching around the planet."2' The fu-
ture does not lie with fragmented service providers, Huber con-
cludes: "notwithstanding the Modified Final Judgment (MFJ)
and divestiture, all the major players clearly see vertical inte-
gration as absolutely imperative."30
Against this background it is not surprising that the Depart-
ment would find that most of the MFJ's line-of-business re-
strictions no longer serve the goals of the antitrust laws or the
public interest. In fact, implicit in the Huber Report is the con-
clusion that the BOCs could not survive in the long term if
their ability to achieve integration efficiencies is denied
through continuation of the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions.
As the Huber Report notes, the BOCs are at financial risk be-
cause their best customers (interexchange carriers and large
businesses) fully recognize their present ability to build around
BOC services, take advantage of regulatory price anomalies for
arbitrage purposes, and then "migrate major customers on to
fully independent, end-to-end, service networks when the job is
completed."' This process has already begun. 2 Because of the
line-of-business restrictions, the BOCs may neither vertically
integrate nor expand outwardly. With the exception of prem-
ises equipment, they may not even resell the goods or services
of others. As other major companies establish themselves as
full-service, end-to-end suppliers, and move their prices for
piece-parts into line with costs, the BOCs will be reduced to
service suppliers of last resort. In Huber's words:
Whatever the Regional Bell Operating Companies are or are
not permitted to do, the Modified Final Judgment's basic vision
of a horizontally stratified telecommunications marketplace,
animated by an obsolescent model of the network as a pyra-
27. Id. at 1.6.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1.20-1.21.
30. Id. at 1.9.
31. Id. at 1.23.
32. Id.
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mid, will not survive. AT&T, IBM, and other major U.S. and
foreign telecommunications and electronics companies are al-
ready gathering for the wake. 3
[W]ithout exception, RBOC business planners recognize that
the freedom to compete as system integrators for large busi-
ness customers is essential to their long-term stability and
profitability. While there can be a good bit of disagreement
about what time frame the "long-term" represents, their as-
sessment is unquestionably correct. 4
This same analysis was explored at some length in our previous
article. s5
In recommending relief from the MFJ's line-of-business re-
strictions, the Department reviewed in some detail regulatory
developments since divestiture. The Department essentially.
concluded that at the federal level, the regulatory process had
improved since the MFJ had been entered.36 While not retreat-
ing from the reasonableness of its 1982 conclusion that regula-
tors in 1982 were incapable of preventing such anticompetitive
conduct as "cross-subsidization""7 and discriminatory intercon-
nection with essential facilities, 3 the Department now found
that regulatory actions since 1982 had dramatically reduced the
level of suspicion that regulatory agencies could not perform
their duties properly. For example, in the area of "cross-subsi-
dization," the Department found that:
[T]he FCC's Joint Cost rules reasonably can be expected to
reduce the risk of any over-allocation of costs to regulated ac-
tivities that would create competitive concerns. The FCC has
the accounting expertise to review the BOCs' cost allocation
manuals, and these manuals also will be subjected to close pub-
lic scrutiny.
39
Similar views were expressed with regard to equal exchange
33. Id. at 1.2.
34. Id. at 1.23.
35. McKenna & Slyter, supra note 1, at 65-71.
36. See, e.g., DOJ Report, supra note 6, at 52, 135-36, 137-47, 179-81. The Depart-
ment, however, also found that some state regulators were stifling competition in
some intrastate markets. Id. at 34-35.
37. See Competitive Impact Statement of the Department of Justice in Connec-
tion with Proposed Modification of Final Judgment in Civil Action Nos. 74-1698 and
82-0192, United States v. Western Elec. Co. (D.D.C.), reprinted in 47 Fed. Reg. 7170,
7173 (Feb. 17, 1982) [hereinafter Competitive Impact Statement].
38. Id., 47 Fed. Reg. at 7172-73.
39. DOJ Report, supra note 6, at 145-46 (footnote omitted).
1987]
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access, 40 information access,41 terminal equipment2 and
manufacturing.3
It will be recalled that one of the main points in our previous
article was that the Department and the district court erred in
1982 when they seriously underestimated the ability of the FCC
to accomplish its regulatory goals. The FCC's proven ability to
enact a successful regulatory structure underlies, in significant
part, the Department's recommendation that most of the
MFJ's line-of-business restrictions be eliminated." This failure
of the Department and the district court to recognize competi-
tive and regulatory reality resulted from an inability to realize
that the markets which the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions
purport to protect were, in numerous significant instances, in
the process of being nurtured into the competitive era by the
FCC at the time divestiture was ordered.45 It might be tempt-
ing, accordingly, to contend that the Department's current view
of the viability of regulation is nothing more than a change of
heart disguised as a change of circumstance.46
But the assumptions inherent in the Department's original
position have now been overtaken by subsequent actions which
confirm that the issues addressed by the line-of-business re-
strictions are primarily regulatory, not judicial in nature. In
1982 the Department and the court assumed that regulation
would not be sufficient to protect the interests addressed by the
MFJ's line-of-business restrictions. At that time, however, the
markets, competitors and regulations were themselves either
new or still being developed. Thus, the line-of-business restric-
tions were imposed on the basis of speculation as to the future
of regulation.47
Nevertheless, the FCC's actual ability to develop, implement
and enforce the rules which now govern the telecommunica-
tions industry had not, in 1982, been tested. While we continue
40. Id. at 69-70.
41. Id. at 137-47.
42. Id. at 163-65.
43. Id.
44. McKenna & Slyter, supra note 1, at 25-26.
45. See id. at 26-27, 32-42.
46. Not surprisingly, many parties filing in response to the DOJ Report took pre-
cisely such a position. MCI Response, supra note 16, at 2-5.
47. Indeed, Huber noted with some bewilderment that the Department, having
"presented no evidence at all concerning competition in markets for electronic infor-
mation services," nevertheless imposed the information service restrictions on the
BOCs "seemingly as an afterthought." HUBER REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.27.
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to believe that prohibitory injunctive provisions should be
based on evidence and not speculation, it must be conceded that
the FCC's substantial success in tailoring its regulatory regime
to meet the competitive markets of the post-divestiture world
was not nearly as certain in 1982 as it is today. In short, while it
should have been assumed in 1982 that the FCC was capable of
fulfilling its statutory mandate, events since 1982 have proven
conclusively that the FCC is more than capable of doing so.
Of course, the Department's Report is not without its short-
comings. Its treatment of interexchange services remains sim-
plistic. In particular, it fails to recognize that in the competitive
telecommunications market, there are numerous ways of
preventing abuse of market power by the owner of an essential
facility short of a flat market prohibition." Nevertheless, the
Department's Report goes a long way toward recognizing that
the BOCs cannot be expected to provide the quality exchange
services, which form the heart of their current businesses,
without substantial freedom to participate in the nationwide in-
formation market on a broad scale.
II
A Brief Rejoinder to Mr. Worthington
In his article for the Symposium, John Worthington sets
forth a view of divestiture from the perspective of MCI Com-
munications Corporation (MCI).49 MCI was, and remains, a
key player in the development of the competitive telecommuni-
cations marketplace, and Mr. Worthington's views deserve con-
sideration and respect. While advocating the position of MCI
with considerable eloquence, Mr. Worthington nevertheless
reaches several conclusions which are significantly flawed. Es-
sentially, Mr. Worthington contends that all of the MFJ's line-
of-business restrictions should be continued. For the most part,
his argument is predicated on the historical ability of the inte-
grated Bell System to exercise enormous market power, and
not on the realities of the post-divestiture world. 5 Mr. Worth-
ington makes two major arguments: 1) FCC regulation has al-
ways been and will continue to be ineffective in controlling
48. McKenna & Slyter, supra note 1, at 49-56.
49. Worthington, supra note 3.
50. Prior to divestiture AT&T controlled 80% of the nationwide exchange lines
and more than 90% of the interexchange business, in addition to its manufacturing
and research arms. See McKenna & Slyter, supra note 1, at 15.
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anticompetitive conduct by the BOCs;51 and 2) Congress is
without power to remedy the current MFJ situation through
targeted legislation.52 In this section, the authors briefly ad-
dress each of these points and, in addition, comment briefly on
an internal contradiction in Mr. Worthington's article which
has marked much of the analysis of the MFJ since 1982.
A. The Efficacy of Regulation
Mr. Worthington contends at some length that FCC regula-
tion will not provide a sufficient check on BOC market power,
and that the line-of-business restrictions should, accordingly, be
retained in their current form.5 Most of Mr. Worthington's ar-
guments are directly addressed in our previous article." The
collateral assertion set forth by Mr. Worthington, that the FCC
is incompetent or biased,5 would not be a proper basis upon
which to retain an anticompetitive injunction even if it were
true. The point does not merit analysis. However, Mr. Worth-
ington's implication that the FCC itself has conceded that it
cannot effectively regulate the divested BOCs does deserve
additional comment. In this context, the FCC's actual position
on the effectiveness of its own regulatory regime becomes
relevant.
First, even if the Commission's purported inability to regu-
late the unified Bell System were relevant to its post-divesti-
ture regulatory abilities, the Commission has never stated that
it was incapable of fulfilling its statutory mandate under the
Communications Act. To the contrary, the Commission has
been protective of its jurisdiction in dealing with the MFJ court
from the beginning of the case. For example, on December 30,
1975, the FCC filed a Memorandum As Amicus Curiae with the
MFJ court in which it elaborated on the interplay between its
regulatory jurisdiction under the Communications Act, vis-a-
vis the court's jurisdiction under the antitrust laws.57 While ad-
vising the court that FCC regulation had not totally preempted
court jurisdiction, the Commission nevertheless advised the
51. Worthington, supra note 3, at 101.
52. Id. at 97.
53. Id. at 97-104, 109-12.
54. McKenna & Slyter, supra note 1, at 42-56, 56-65.
55. Worthington, supra note 3, at 97, 101-06.
56. See id. at 82, 106.
57. Memorandum of FCC as Amicus Curiae, United States v. American Tel. and
Tel. Co., Civil Action No. 74-1698, reprinted in 62 F.C.C.2d 1102 (1977).
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court that "[i]nsofar as the specific allegations of conduct are
concerned.., the Commission regards virtually all of them as
within its own regulatory jurisdiction."''s The Commission in
this Memorandum listed a series of regulatory actions which
would be beyond the court's jurisdiction. 9
Similarly, in the Tunney Act proceeding prior to entry of the
MFJ in 1982, the Commission again appeared and explained the
function and scope of its regulatory powers6e In recom-
mending that the line-of-business restrictions be eliminated en-
tirely, the Commission made repeated reference to the vitality
of its own regulatory structure,6' and in fact noted that even
the MFJ's equal access provisions generally duplicated the ex-
isting and contemplated regulatory scheme.6 2
The Commission again reiterated its position in its recent
comments to the court on the DOJ Report, in which the Com-
mission unequivocally stated:
However, the Commission has developed regulatory mecha-
nisms more precisely tailored to the new marketplace condi-
tions that should permit the Court to conclude that there is no
substantial possibility that a BOC could use any market power
it may possess to impede competition. Through several exten-
sive proceedings, this Commission has developed safeguards
that will ensure fair, unimpeded competition if the RBOCs are
relieved of the decree's absolute entry restrictions.
6 3
Given this consistent position by the FCC on the scope of its
own competence, the following statement in Mr. Worthing-
ton's article seems to raise a direct conflict: "The evidentiary
record in AT&T includes testimony of FCC officials to the ef-
58. Id. at 1119.
59. These included entry and exit regulations, interconnection standards, and
tariff regulations. Id. at 1119-20.
60. Brief of the FCC as Amicus Curiae in Civil Action No. 74-1698 at 22-28, 52-53
(filed Apr. 20, 1982), United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., (D.D.C. 1982) [herein-
after Brief of the FCC as Amicus Curiae].
61. Id. at 30-31.
62. Brief of the FCC as Amicus Curiae on Question No. 1, Civil Action No. 74-1698
at 15-17 (filed June 14,1982) United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T), 552 F.
Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
63. Comments of the FCC as Amicus Curiae on the Report and Recommenda-
tions of the United States Concerning the Line of Business Restrictions Imposed on
the Bell Operating Companies by the Modification of Final Judgment in Civil Action
No. 82-0192 at 9-10 (filed Mar. 13, 1987), United States v. Western Elec. Co., Inc.,
(D.D.C.) (footnote omitted). The FCC supported continuation of a somewhat modi-
fied version of the interexchange service prohibition notwithstanding its finding con-
cerming its own regulatory authority. Id. at 31-44.
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fect that the Commission was fundamentally unable to regulate
an integrated Bell System."" Thus, it is important to examine
the source of this testimony. Mr. Worthington cites testimony
of Walter Hinchman and William Melody as proof of this osten-
sibly damning admission by the FCC. While testifying to this
effect in a variety of proceedings prior to the AT&T divestiture,
including the AT&T case itself,' neither Mr. Hinchman nor
Dr. Melody had any authority to speak for the FCC on this is-
sue. In fact, not only did their testimony not reflect the posi-
tion of the FCC itself, but the validity of their opinion can be
seriously questioned.
Some background is appropriate. Mr. Hinchman was chief of
the FCC's Common Carrier Bureau from January, 1974 until
late 1978. Dr. Melody was a staff economist with the Common
Carrier Bureau. By the time they testified at the AT&T trial,
they were not affiliated with the FCC in any way. However,
these two individuals also testified to the same effect at another
trial involving AT&T which, unlike the trial which led to the
MFJ, actually resulted in a verdict-that AT&T had not vio-
lated the antitrust laws vis-a-vis Southern Pacific Communica-
tions Company. 6 The observation of the District Court Judge
Charles Richey in that case on the testimony of Mr. Hinchman
and Dr. Melody indicates the care which must be exercised
before one accepts their testimony as representative of the
FCC's position on anything. We offer several excerpts without
further comment:
Mr. Hinchman in particular lacks any credibility. It was Mr.
Hinchman who as Chief of the Common Carrier Bureau had
the job of regulating the Bell System from January 1, 1974 un-
til September-October, 1978. Yet, he goes around the country
now saying he could not do it. At the same time he testifies in
every forum possible against the Bell System and its "evils".67
Dr. Melody is the same individual who acted as a consultant
to the FCC while at the same time consulting with AT&T's
competitors, MCI and DATRAN. If Dr. Melody were a lawyer,
he would surely have been a target of disciplinary proceedings
for this conduct .... It is based on these facts that the Court
64. Worthington, supra note 3, at 82.
65. Id. at 82 n.32.
66. Southern Pac. Com. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F. Supp. 825, 913
(D.D.C. 1982), qffd, 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 (1985).
67. 556 F. Supp. at 913 n.88.
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will accord no credibility to the testimony of Dr. Melody and
Mr. Hinchman. It is this type of improper conduct that gives
the Government a bad name and should not be co-
untenanced68
The Court has had ample opportunity to observe Mr. Hinch-
man-he testified in this case on three separate occasions-
and it is an understatement to say, as the Court found above,
that he lacks credibility.6
It is apparent from these passages that the testimony of Mr.
Hinchman and Dr. Melody in the AT&T case, which did not
even result in a finding, cannot undermine the thoughtful ap-
proach to regulatory issues that has marked the Commission's
official filings over the years.
B. Constitutionality of Legislative Solution to MFJ
A large part of Mr. Worthington's article deals with the so-
called Dole Bill, a legislative proposal to re-vest telecommuni-
cations regulatory jurisdiction in the Federal Communications
Commission.7° The Dole Bill died in committee when the
Ninety-Ninth Congress adjourned, and its specific provisions
are no longer before the Congress. It is expected that no fur-
ther congressional initiatives will be undertaken in this area, at
least until after the district court has reviewed the Depart-
ment's recommendation and takes action. Nevertheless, some
brief comment is appropriate on the legal principles espoused
by Mr. Worthington in his effort to demonstrate that the Dole
Bill would have been unconstitutional. The Dole Bill aside,
Congress clearly has the legal authority to vacate prospective
enforcement of an antitrust injunction in a suit brought by the
United States as plaintiff.
In a nutshell, Mr. Worthington argues that legislation to re-
store to the FCC jurisdiction to regulate the nation's telecom-
munications system would violate the separation of powers
mandate of the federal Constitution in three separate ways:
1. It would unlawfully authorize the FCC to review an or-
der of a federal court, in contravention of the doctrine enunci-
ated in Hayburn's Case;
71
68. Id. at 914.
69. Id. at 995 n.207. See also, e.g., id. at 1055-58.
70. S. 2565, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CoNG. REc. S7750 (daily ed. June 18, 1986).
71. Worthington, supra note 3, at 90-92.
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2. It would unlawfully predetermine the outcome of a
pending lawsuit, contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling in
United States v. Klein;7 2 and
3. It would constitute a direct exercise of the judicial power
by Congress.7"
What Mr. Worthington is in fact arguing is that Congress' only
lawful remedy when a prospective injunction obtained by the
United States is deemed contrary to public policy is to modify
the entire body of law on which the injunction is based (in this
case, the Sherman Act).74
The legal principles espoused by Mr. Worthington are all be-
yond reproach. Congress clearly may not usurp the judicial au-
thority, reverse a final judgment at law or modify judicially
established private rights. But these principles have no applica-
bility to legislation directed toward enforcement of a prospec-
tive injunction like the MFJ which vindicates a public right.
The law has been clear for more than a century that Congress'
legislative authority includes the right to vacate, modify or
transfer administration and execution of prospective injunc-
tions in cases such as the MFJ proceeding.
The lead case on this question is Pennsylvania v. Wheeling
and Belmont Bridge Company.75 There, the Supreme Court
had issued an order declaring that a bridge across the Ohio
River constituted an obstruction of navigation, and decreed
that the bridge either be destroyed or elevated. Thereafter,
Congress enacted a law which declared that the bridge subject
to the order (and one other bridge) were "lawful structures in
their present positions and elevations. '7 Responding to argu-
ments almost identical to those advanced by Mr. Worthington
in his article, the Supreme Court expressly recognized that an
"act of Congress cannot have the effect and operation to annul
the judgment of the court already rendered.., especially as it
72. Id. at 92-95.
73. Id. at 95-97.
74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
75. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855).
76. The law read, in pertinent part:
That the bridges across the Ohio River at Wheeling, in the State of Virginia,
and at Bridgeport, in the State of Ohio, abutting on Zane's Island, in said
river, are hereby declared to be lawful structures in their present positions
and elevations, and shall be so held and taken to be, anything in the law or
laws of the United States to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id. at 429.
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respects adjudication upon the private rights of parties. ' 77 How-
ever, the Court noted that the law is quite different in the case
of a "continuing decree, which requires not only the removal of
the bridge, but enjoins the defendants against any reconstruc-
tion or continuance."7 " In such a case, due to the intervening
Act of Congress, "[t]here is no longer any interference with the
enjoyment of the public right inconsistent with law .... ,79 Be-
cause Congress modified the public right by declaring the
bridge lawful, the Supreme Court had no choice but to dissolve
the injunction.
This essential principle-that the general rule prohibiting
Congress from interfering in the judicial process does not apply
to legislation which affects execution of prospective decrees in-
volving public rights-has been consistently recognized ever
since.80 And the precept is really quite simple. Execution and
administration of an injunction enforcing a public right is quite
a different function than adjudicating a lawsuit or protecting
private rights. Neither MCI, AT&T, nor any other entity
which views the MFJ as enhancing its own private competitive
position may prevent Congress from determining how public
policy should be formulated or enforced.
Thus, should the Congress need to examine the MFJ issues
addressed in the Dole Bill again in the future, it can focus on its
primary charge of determining where the public interest lies.
Congress quite clearly has the constitutional authority to pass
legislation such as was set forth in the bill proposed by Senator
Dole.
C. Cross-Subsidization
Mr. Worthington's article reflects a typical preoccupation
with the issue of "cross-subsidization," pricing competitive
services below cost and recovering the losses from regulated
77. Id. at 431.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 432.
80. See, e.g., System Federation No. 91 Ry. Emo. Dept. v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 650
(1961) ("[I]t would be an abuse of discretion to deny a modification of an injunctive
decree after Congress had changed the law upon which the decree was bound");
Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600, 604 (1923) (reaffirming the "doctrine that a judgment
declaring a public right may be annulled by subsequent legislation"). See also Raf-
ferty v. Smith, Bell & Co., 257 U.S. 226, 232 (1921); Clinton Bridge, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
454, 462-63 (1870); Carpenter v. Wabash Ry. Co., 309 U.S. 23, 28 (1940).
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rates."1 This perceived danger to competition permeates much
of the court's and the Department's analysis as well. 2 How-
ever, elsewhere in his article, Mr. Worthington chides the
BOCs for not engaging in the very cross-subsidization practices
which he so roundly condemns 3 This inconsistency merits
some brief comments.
Specifically, Mr. Worthington expresses dismay that the
BOCs have not utilized revenues from competitive ventures "to
hold down local rates."8' 4 In the case of competitive Yellow
Pages revenues, for example, Mr. Worthington claims that "the
BOCs broke faith with Congress and the court, and chose to
divert their Yellow Pages revenue away from the support of
local telephone service. "8 As a reason for maintaining the
MFJ's provisions that preclude BOC entry into most busi-
nesses, Mr. Worthington quotes with approval the opinion of
the court that it is likely that the BOCs "will not share the
profits from these [competitive] ventures with the ratepay-
ers."' 6 In essence, Mr. Worthington complains that BOCs have
committed a moral, if not a legal, wrong by declining to cross-
subsidize their local services with revenues from other
businesses.
The mischief inherent in this position is readily apparent. It
is difficult, if not impossible, to sustain a competitive venture in
the long term while requiring that venture to subsidize another
business. Thus, Mr. Worthington's subsidy plan makes little
practical sense. But perhaps more significantly, if Mr. Worth-
ington's proposal could be sustained, the end result would be to
stifle exchange competition through below-cost pricing, pre-
cisely the evil about which MCI has complained so bitterly over
the past decade. 7
We point out this inconsistency because it typifies the logic so
often put forth in support of continuing the MFJ's line-of-busi-
ness restrictions. As we noted in our previous article, the
MFJ's most fundamental premise was that the BOCs would
provide natural monopoly exchange services--and nothing else.
81. Worthington, supra note 3, at 104-06.
82. See, e.g., DOJ Report, supra note 6, at 31-34; AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 172, 188.
83. Worthington, supra note 3, at 107-09.
84. Id. at 107.
85. Id. at 108.
86. Id. at 109 (quoting United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 846, 866
(D.D.C. 1984)).
87. See, e.g., MCI Response, supra note 16, at 40-42.
[Vol. 9:565
FURTHER PERSPECTIVE ON DIVESTITURE
Yet this premise was palpably false by the time the MFJ was
implemented, both by virtue of the fact that exchange competi-
tion already existed and by virtue of the- fact that the BOCs
were in competitive interexchange, terminal equipment and di-
rectory publishing businesses." The Huber Report further
confirms that the provision of local exchange service is not a
natural monopoly." Yet the fact of exchange competition is
conveniently ignored by parties whose rhetoric seems to indi-
cate a hope that, if wishes are only sincere enough, the comfort-
able world envisioned in the MFJ might still come to pass. Mr.
Worthington's position on cross-subsidizing local exchange ser-
vice is an example of such a wish.
III
Conclusion
With the filing of the DOJ's Report with the MFJ court, the
MFJ proceeding has entered another phase. Assuming that the
Department adheres to its preliminary position and moves that
the court change the line-of-business restrictions to conform to
its report, and further assuming that the court accepts the De-
partment's position, there will remain only two significant in-
junctive provisions in the MFJ applicable to the BOCs. These
are the prohibition against "in-region" interexchange service
and the equal access injunction. While these two issues are also
well within the scope of proper regulatory jurisdiction en-
trusted to the Federal Communications Commission," the ac-
tions recommended by the Department will be a welcome first
step in ameliorating the harm to American telecommunications
business caused by the MFJ's injunctive restrictions.
88. McKenna & Slyter, supra note 1, at 20-25.
89. HUBER REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.1-2.26.
90. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-55 (1982).
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